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DUE PROCESS
factors such as whether the facility was "competently staffed and
properly equipped" and "operated in the manner" required by
the Public Health Laws and whether the people who ran the
facility "possess[ed] the character, competence, training, and
ability" to administer the facility, clearly discretionary factors."m
Because Daxor's provisional licenses could be revoked at any
time and thus did not give rise to a property interest, Daxor was
not entitled to a due process hearing.3 7
It is clear from the previous cases that the federal and state law
governing the protection of property rights under due process are
coterminous. Both federal and New York State courts look at
whether the party claiming the property right has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it under the law or contract that
established the right'38 and then decide whether the law grants
discretion to the authority granting the right.3 9 Finally, both the
state and federal courts apply a balancing test"0 in order to see
how much discretion defeats the entitlement."'
People v. Thompson" 2
(decided October 23, 1997)
Defendant appealed his conviction,"' claiming his right to due
process under the New York State Constitution'" was violated
136 Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 575 (2), § 573 (2) (McKinney
1990)).
'
37 Id. at 99-100, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
138 Id. at 98, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (citing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
139 Id. at 98-99, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194 (citing RRI Realty
Corp. v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989)).
1 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
141 Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1986); Daror, 90
N.Y.2d at 99, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
142 90 N.Y.2d 615, 687 N.E.2d 1304, 665 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1997).
1 Id. at 618, 687 N.E.2d at 1304, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 23. Defendant was
convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, five counts of rape in the first
degree, four counts of sodomy in the first degree, assault in the second degree,
and robbery in the third degree. Id.
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when a substitute judge was allowed to hear the remainder of his
trial after the initial judge got sick. 4  The Appellate Division,
Second Department affirmed his conviction, 46 holding there was
"'no per se constitutional right to have the same Judge preside
throughout a criminal defendant's trial."' 47  The New York
Court of Appeals, upon granting leave to appeal, 48 found that "a
Judge may be substituted for another if the original Judge
becomes incapacitated during a jury trial, as long as the substitute
indicates on the record the requisite familiarity with the
proceedings and no undue prejudice occurs to the defendant or
the People." "4 Finding no prejudice, 50 the Court of Appeals held
defendant's right to due process was not violated.'
144 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant part that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
4' Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d at 616, 687 N.E.2d at 1305, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
A jury trial was commenced on January 14, 1993. Id. at 617, 687 N.E.2d at
1305, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 22. On January 25, 1993, the opening statement was
delivered by the People. Id. Several prosecution witnesses gave testimony
over the next several days. Id. On February 1, 1993, the People and the
defendant were informed by the judge's law secretary that the Justice was
unexpectedly hospitalized and required surgery and would be unable to
continue with the trial until April. Id. No matters were pending before the
court, and another Justice was assigned to continue the case. Id. Defendant
submitted a motion for a mistrial. Id. at 617-18, 687 N.E.2d at 1305, 665
N.Y.S.2d at 22. Oral arguments on the motion were heard by the new Justice.
Id. "Defendant consented to this Justice presiding over the remainder of the
case should the mistrial motion be denied." Id. "Noting that the grounds
presented on the mistrial motion would also warrant the granting of 'a motion
to set aside any guilty verdict' that might be returned, the Justice reserved
decision on the mistrial motion." Id. (quoting People v. Thompson, 158
Misc. 2d 397, 400, 601 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1993)). The
trial resumed, and defendant was convicted. Id. at 618, 687 N.E.2d at 1306,
665 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23. Defendant again raised his mistrial motion, and the
court denied the motion. Id. Defendant was sentenced to 119 2 years to life
and defendant appealed. Id.
146 Id. at 618, 687 N.E.2d at 1305, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
" Id. (quoting People v. Thompson, 222 A.D.2d 156, 161, 645 N.Y.S.2d
884, 888 (2d Dep't 1996)).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 621, 687 N.E.2d at 1308, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
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Both the Federal.5 and New York State' Constitutions
guarantee a right to a jury trial, New York courts have
interpreted the right to a jury trial in the New York Constitution
as a right that "existed at common-law." '1 The Court of Appeals
has held that "when issue is joined upon an indictment, the trial
must be by the tribunal and in the mode which the Constitution
and laws provide without any essential change." I
Relying on these principles, New York courts have ruled that it
was impermissible for a judge to substitute during a trial.'$ It
was impossible, the Thompson court explained, "to ascertain
'what influence (the original judge) might have exercised during
the trial, or in determining the punishment to be inflicted upon
the prisoner." '
Similarly, federal courts had followed the same proposition,
basing their decisions upon the then unquestioned, nonwaivable
right to a trial by jury.' In Freeman v. United States,"' the
150 Id. at 621-22, 687 N.E.2d at 1308, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
15 Id. at 622, 687 N.E.2d at 1308, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
11 See U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o
person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." Id. See also U.S. CONST.
art. Ill. Article HI provides that "[tihe trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury." Id.
15 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. This provision states: "Trial by jury in all
cases in which it is heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall
remain inviolate forever." Id.
154 Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d at 619, 687 N.E.2d at 1306, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 23
(quoting People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 311, 487 N.E.2d at 896, 496
N.Y.S.2d at 986 (1985)).
's1 Id. (quoting People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128, 138 (1858)).
15 6 Id.
157 Id. (quoting Blend v. People, 41 N.Y. 604, 606 (1870)). In Blend,
defendant was tried before a three member bench. Id. at 604. When one of
the Justices never returned from a dinner recess, another qualified Justice was
appointed to finish the trial. Id. at 605. Defendant was convicted, and he
appealed. Id. The conviction was reversed, as the court held that "the
prisoner had a right to insist that his trial should proceed before the same court
before which it was commenced." Id. at 606.
158 Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d at 619, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
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Second Circuit held that "[t]he continuous presence of the same
judge and jury is equally essential throughout the whole trial." 110
In United States v. LaSorsa,6 1 however, the Second Circuit
declined to follow precedent, finding instead a "subsequent
repudiation by the United States Supreme Court."162 The
enactment of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter
"F.R.C.P."] Rule 25 (a)'63 in 1966 created guidelines to protect
the rights of criminal defendants in the event of a need for judge
substitution.14 Specifically, a three prong test was established to
1' 227 F. 732 (2nd Cir. 1915) (holding in overturning defendant's conviction
"[i]t is without question that it is the duty of a trial judge to be present during
all stages of a criminal trial.").
160 Id. at 759-60.
161 480 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1973). Defendant was indicted on a charge of
conspiracy to sell heroin without the buyer's written order form in violation of
26 U.S.C. §§ 4705 (a), 7237 (b). Id. at 524. The presiding judge, having
taken ill, was replaced on the last day of the trial. Id. at 530. The substitute
judge complied with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 25(a). Id.
The jury returned a guilty verdict to the substitute judge. Id. Upon the
announcement of the verdict, the substitute judge stated that the first judge
would pass sentencing as he was more familiar with the case. Id. The first
judge passed sentence. Id. The court stated in its holding
We are not bound by ... [a] case, decided over fifty-five
years ago [which] rested on a principle subsequently
repudiated by the United States Supreme Court in Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, (1930) the principle that a
defendant may not waive his right to a jury
trial .... Inasmuch as the defendants do not claim, and have
not shown, that they suffered substantial prejudice from the
substitution of judges this claim is without merit.
Id. at 531 (citation omitted).162 id.
163 FED. R. CRiM. P. 25 (a). Rule 25 (a) states:
During trial. If by reason of death, sickness or other
disability, the judge before whom a trial has commenced is
unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly
sitting in or assigned to the court, upon certifying familiarity
with the record of the trial, may proceed with and finish the
trial.
Id.
6 Id.
950 [Vol 14
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ensure that no prejudicial effect would be felt by the defendant.10
First, the primary judge must be unable to continue "by reason of
death, sickness or other disability." 6 1 Second, the substituting
judge must regularly sit in competent jurisdiction,167 and finally,
the substituting judge must certify familiarity with the record of
trial." The LaSorsa court, having found all three elements
met, 169 as well as no evidence of undue prejudice,1r0 found the
defendant's claim of due process violation without merit'7' and
upheld the defendant's conviction.7
In New York, however, there is no rule analogous to Rule 25
(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'" Defendant in
Thompson "contends that the rights guaranteed under the [New
York] State Constitution and the procedural proscriptions of
Judicial Law § 21 prohibit the adoption of procedures similar to
those outlined in Rule 25 (a) in New York." 74 The Court of
Appeals found that though there have been occasions when more
protections of due process rights have been offered by the state,'75
in this context an extension is unwarranted as there is "no [New
York] State constitutional mandate for a jury trial before the same
judge from start to finish." 176 The court further found "nothing
in the requirements of due process that indicates that the midtrial
substitution of a Judge rises to the level of a per se constitutional
violation. Thus, a jury trial before the same Judge does not
represent a nonwaivable, common-law right guaranteed by the
[New York] State Constitution." "
16 LaSorsa, 480 F.2d at 531.
16Id.
167 Id.
16s Id.
169 Id. at 530.
170Id. at 531.
171 Id.
17 Id.
1' People v. Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d 615, 620, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665
N.Y.S.2d at 24 (1997).
174 Id. at 621-22, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
175d. at 622, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
176 1d
"
" Id. at 621, 687 N.E.2d at 1308, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
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Defendant further contended that Judicial Law § 21 prevented
the substitution of a judge in a trial when not present for oral
argument.7 8 The court rebuffed this claim, holding that this law
"does not prevent the substitution of a Judge in a jury trial since
the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence belongs to the
jury and not the Trial Judge." 79
Both the Federal' 0 and New York Constitutions,' 8' in evaluating
due process claims, "'require the balancing of factors -- 'an
evaluation of the interests of the parties to the dispute, the
adequacy of the contested procedures to protect those interests
and the government's stake in the outcome."'
While New York does not have a statute congruent to Rule
25(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 83 the Court of
Appeals in Thompson opted to maintain the federal standard."84
Applying this standard, the court found that the defendant's
claims to have been "deprived of the 'internal consistency' that a
single Judge brings to a trial" 85 simply does not implicate due
process. 86  Applying this standard, the court found that the
presence of the same judge from commencement to conclusion of
a trial is not inviolable component to a fair trial under state or
federal constitutional analysis."
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See supra note 10.
181 See N.Y. CONST. art. I § 2.
12 Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d at 621, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 24
(quoting La Rossa v. Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 583, 588, 468 N.E.2d 19, 479
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984)).
183 Id. at 620, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
' d. at 621, 687 N.E.2d at 1307, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
185 Thompson, 222 A.D.2d at 161, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
186 id 
,117 hompson, 90 N.Y.2d at 622, 687 N.E.2d at 1308, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
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